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I. INTRODUCTION
There is no doubt that technology has transformed the
banking industry. It has allowed the development of an incredi-
ble array of new products and services. It has permitted gather-
ing, sorting and using information in novel ways. It has radically
modified the cost equation of providing products and services. It
2000]
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allows a new form of convenience, as customers can access bank-
ing information, products and services, as well as a multitude of
other items, from the convenience of their homes or businesses,
without ever having to enter the bank's premises.
This discussion will address the issue of electronic bank-
ing - the business of allowing individual consumers to access
and use banking information, products and services via personal
computer. It will do so from the perspective of the banking or-
ganization itself: the regulatory, legal and structural considera-
tions that affect how the bank engages in these activities. It will
explore the permissible limits of cyberbanking - the extent to
which the banking organization may involve itself in technology-
related activities as part of its banking business. The primary fo-
cus will be on the banking agencies - the OCC, the Federal Re-
serve and the FDIC, rather than the OTS.
This discussion is, of course, a work in progress. The
regulatory and legal environment changes as rapidly as the
Internet changes. Just as it transforms the business of selling
books or cars or music, it has transformed the business of selling
loans, deposit services and the like. It presents special challenges
and special opportunities. One of those challenges, however, is
dealing with the impact of a legal and regulatory environment
that was designed for a world of paper documents and pen and
ink signatures, a world where there were branches on corners
and loan officers sitting in offices. These are not part of the world
of cyberbanking.
II. THE BASICS: THE ABILITY TO OFFER BANKING PRODUCrS AND
SERVICES ELECTRONICALLY
A. Basic Authority
1. National Banks.
The National Bank Act permits national banks to exercise
"all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
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business of banking." As defined over the years, the powers of
national banks have been broadly construed to allow a huge
range of banking, financial and related activities.
In its revision to its regulatory interpretations in 1997, the
OCC added specific authority to engage in electronic banking
activities. The revision provides as follows:
Furnishing of products and services by electronic
means and facilities. A national bank may per-
form, provide, or deliver through electronic means
and facilities any activity, function, product, or
service that it is otherwise authorized to perform,
provide, or deliver. A national bank may also, in
order to optimize the use of the bank's resources,
market and sell to third parties electronic capaci-
ties acquired or developed by the bank in good
faith for banking purposes.2
While there would appear to be little remarkable about
the declaration, it should eliminate a substantial amount of inter-
play and interaction with the OCC about the permissibility of
various electronic banking activities. The OCC has issued a sig-
nificant number of letters to financial institutions in which it has
confirmed this basic power. For example, the OCC has allowed
twelve national banks to create Integrion Financial Network, a
venture designed to offer home banking and related services over
the Internet and through the use of other electronic devices.3
2. State Banks - FDIC's Section 24 Authority
State bank powers generally derive from state law, subject
1.12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
2.12 C.F.R. § 7.1019 (1999).
3. See OCC Conditional Approval Letter 221, Bank of America National Trust
and Savings Association et al: Notice of Intent to Establish Operating Subsidiaries
Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 5.34 to Become a Member of a Limited Liability Company to
Provide Data Processing for Home Banking and Other Electronic Financial Services
(December 4, 1996), available in 1996 WL 742689.
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to the overlay of federal statutes that can provide important con-
straints. Of particular importance is Section 24 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act,4 which was added in 1991 as part of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. It
permits state-chartered banks to engage in any activity that is
permissible for national banks as principal, unless the FDIC de-
termines that the activity would pose a threat to the insurance
fund. Accordingly, in the electronic banking arena, the OCC
precedents on bank-permissible activities generally define the
parameters of permissible state bank activities.
Many states also have so-called "wild card" statutes, pur-
suant to which state chartered banks may exercise powers
granted national banks, even where no specific statutory author-
ity is contained in the state statute.
From time to time there may be no particular OCC prece-
dent with respect to a particular activity. The OCC has enter-
tained requests for interpretive rulings from state chartered
banks as to whether an activity would be permissible for a na-
tional bank. As an example, a state chartered bank went to the
OCC to obtain a ruling that acting as an Internet service provider
was a permissible adjunct to a home banking service.5
3. Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve has no chartering authority, and its
statutes generally do not provide enabling powers to the banks it
regulates. Such powers are derived from the statutes of the state
chartering authority. The Federal Reserve, however, has in other
circumstances approved electronic banking activities for financial
institutions. These precedents provide broad comfort that the
performance of traditional banking activities through electronic
means is permissible.6 The Federal Reserve supervisory releases
4.12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
5. See OCC Interpretive Letter 742 (August 19, 1996), available in 1996 WL
544203.
6. See, e.g., Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (Nov. 1999), 85 Fed. Res. Bull.
733, available in 1999 WL 1060123; Royal Bank of Canada (April 1996), 82 Fed. Res.
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discussed below demonstrate the Federal Reserve's general sup-
port for electronic banking as a permissible activity.
B. Supervisory Concerns
Just because the activity is permissible does not mean that
the regulatory bodies are not concerned about how the activity is
conducted. The regulators have gone to great lengths to provide
guidance and direction to financial institutions seeking to offer
banking products and services over the Internet.
1. No Specific Prior Approval Requirements, But
Prior Discussion Advised
Unless an institution is engaging in an activity that would
otherwise require approval, none of the agencies will require
prior approval for an existing bank to commence electronic bank-
ing activities. This is in contrast to the OTS requirement that be-
fore a savings and loan association commences a "transactional"
banking service over the Internet, thirty days' prior notice to the
agency is required.7 However, even though no prior notice or
approval is required by the banking agencies, banks are advised
to notify and consult with their primary federal regulator prior to
commencing significant activities. Not only will the regulators
be appreciative of the prior notice, they often have useful infor-
mation and experience to impart. Of particular usefulness will be
the agencies' perspectives on risks and pitfalls.
Prior approval will be required to establish a new bank
that will engage in electronic banking, to establish an operating
subsidiary to participate in a technology venture or for a bank
holding company to acquire more than five percent of a company
engaged in permissible technology or electronic banking activi-
ties. These approval requirements are driven, however, not by
the technology or electronic banking nature of the activity, but
rather by the general statutory and regulatory requirements ap-
Bull. 363, available in 1996 WL 167021; Cardinal Bancshares, Inc. Uuly 1996), 82 Fed.
Res. Bull. 674, available in 1996 WL 167021.
7. See 12 C.F.R. § 555 (1999).
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plicable to new bank charters, operating subsidiaries or holding
company investments.
2. Identification of Risks
The explosion of technology in the financial services indus-
try has resulted in a wealth of new services and efficiencies. Un-
fortunately, along with these opportunities have come a variety
of new risks. Identifying and managing these new risks has be-
come the newest challenge for financial institutions and their
regulators.
a. OCC Technology Risk Guidance
OCC Bulletin 98-3, Technology Risk Management Guidance
for Bankers and Examiners, was intended to provide guidance for
national banks concerning how they should identify, measure,
monitor and control the risks associated with the use of technol-
ogy.8 For purposes of this Bulletin, the OCC defines technology
as "the tools and systems that are used to store, receive, transmit,
process and recover information" including, but not limited to,
computer hardware and software, and telecommunications links.
Bulletin 98-3 addresses two main issues. First, it outlines
the primary risks related to the use of technology by banks. Sec-
ond, the Bulletin describes a risk management process designed
to minimize these risks.
With respect to technology-related risks, the OCC stated
that although banks using technology-related products, services,
delivery channels and processes could potentially be exposed to
all of the nine categories of risk discussed in the OCC's "supervi-
sion by risk" framework, 9 they should be particularly concerned
with transaction, strategic, reputation, and compliance risks.
Transaction risk is the risk to a financial institution's earn-
8. See OCC 98-3, Technolgy Risk Management Guidance for Bankers and Ex-
aminers (Feb. 4,1998), available in 1998 WL 346991.
9. The nine risk categories are credit, compliance, foreign exchange, interest
rate, liquidity, price, reputation, transaction, and strategic. See id.
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ings or capital arising from problems with the institution's deliv-
ery of services. There are countless ways in which technology
may result in transaction risk. For instance, incompatible internal
and external systems may prevent delivery of services and, there-
fore, create transaction risk for the financial institution. Transac-
tion risk may be magnified if banks use outside vendors to
perform services such as loan underwriting or credit scoring as
the bank may not have the ability to adequately monitor the
third-party's use of technology. Insufficient internal controls, se-
curity measures, contingency planning or auditing policies may
also lead to transaction risk.
Strategic risk is the risk to a financial institution's earnings
or capital caused by ineffective planning or decision making re-
lated to future business goals. Strategic risk may arise when
management deploys technology without adequate knowledge
and skills, when the technology does not suit customer needs, or
when the technology is unreliable.
Reputation risk is, as the name suggests, risk to a financial
institution's earnings or capital stemming from negative public
opinion. Reputation problems are not only detrimental to the
financial institution in the present but will likely injure the insti-
tution's ability to establish future relationships or successfully
offer new services. Technology may contribute to an institution's
reputation risk in a variety of ways. For example, security
breaches revealing confidential customer information, disruption
of services, or even simple consumer fear (such as that surround-
ing the Year 2000) can potentially turn public opinion against an
institution.
The final risk that directly relates to a financial institu-
tion's use of technology is compliance risk. Compliance risk is
risk to a financial institution's earnings or capital resulting from
non-compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Non-
compliance may subject an institution to fines, civil money penal-
ties, damages, and the voiding of contracts. In terms of technol-
ogy, compliance risk may arise from the fact that banking laws
were largely designed for paper-based transactions and have not
entirely evolved to address electronic transactions.
The OCC has recognized the risks that confront banks to-
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day, particularly in relation to their use of technology. In this re-
spect, the OCC has explained that along with banks' increased
reliance on technology comes an increased responsibility for un-
derstanding how specific technologies operate and how their use
or failure may expose banks to risk. The OCC has stated that it
will review a bank's technology-related risks together with its
other risks in order to determine the bank's overall risk profile
within the context of the OCC's "supervision by risk" frame-
work.
A bank that is implementing new technology should, ac-
cording to the OCC, "engage in a rigorous analytic process" to
identify and quantify technology-related risks and, to the extent
possible, establish controls to manage risk exposure. Simply put,
banks need to develop risk management programs. With this
goal in mind, OCC Bulletin 98-3 proposes a technology-related
risk management process. The three-step process requires a bank
to: (1) plan for its use of technology; (2) decide how it will imple-
ment the technology; and (3) measure and monitor its risk taking.
These three elements should be the foundation of any technol-
ogy-related risk management process, regardless of the size of
the institution.
The first element of the risk management process is plan-
ning. According to the OCC, effective planning includes: (1) in-
volving the board of directors and senior management in
decision-making throughout the planning process; (2) gathering
and analyzing relevant information regarding new and existing
technologies; and (3) assessing needs and reviewing relevant op-
tions.
The second consideration in the risk management process
concerns the implementation of new technology. Proper imple-
mentation includes bank use of appropriate internal controls
such as clear and measurable goals, and the allocation of specific
responsibilities to specific personnel. Additionally, proper im-
plementation includes having policies and procedures to manage
risk related to the bank's use of technology, to ensure that key
employees and vendors have the expertise and training to handle
new technology, and to thoroughly test new technology systems
and products. Finally, proper implementation includes contin-
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gency planning designed to reduce bank vulnerability to system
failures, unauthorized intrusions, and other problems.
The third step in the OCC's suggested risk management
process requires the bank to ensure that its measurement and
monitoring efforts effectively identify ways to manage risk expo-
sure. The OCC will evaluate the bank's auditing and quality as-
surance programs to determine whether the institution's
measurement and monitoring policies are sufficient.
b. FRB SR 98-9
In April 1998, the Federal Reserve published SR 98-9 in
order to provide its examiners with guidance in evaluating the
effectiveness of a financial institution's ability to manage the risks
associated with information technology.10 Information technol-
ogy refers to a combination of computer hardware and software
telecommunications, and information. Much like OCC Bulletin
98-3, SR 98-9 recognized the increasing role that technology
played in all levels of a financial institution's operations and in-
formation processing. The increasing role of technology also cre-
ated a source of new risk, as evidenced by the concerns
surrounding the Year 2000. The goal of the Federal Reserve was
essentially to adapt its risk-focused supervisory process to the
changing role of information technology.
Unlike OCC Bulletin 98-3, which proposed a specific risk
management process, the Federal Reserve in SR 98-9 set forth five
"information technology elements" to be evaluated in terms of
the overall business risks of the financial institution. Essentially,
examiners were to consider the effect that the five elements
would have on the risks (including credit, market, liquidity, op-
erational, legal, and reputational risks) confronting a particular
financial institution.
The five information technology elements to be considered
by Federal Reserve examiners were management processes, architec-
10. See SR 98-9 (April 20, 1998), (visited March 5, 2000) <http://www.federal
reserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETrERS/1998/SR9809.HTM>.
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ture, integrity, security, and availability. The first element, man-
agement processes, broadly encompasses planning, investment,
development, execution, and staffing of information technology
programs. Examples of management processes include strategic
planning, management succession policies, and regular inde-
pendent audits. With regard to this first element, Federal Re-
serve examiners are to consider not only whether the information
technology strategies of the organization are consistent with the
organization's mission and business objectives, but also whether
the organization has the appropriate management processes in
place to execute those information technology strategies.
Architecture, the second information technology element,
refers to the underlying design of the automated information sys-
tem and its component parts such as network communications,
hardware, and software. Effective architecture meets both the
current and long-term business objectives and capacity require-
ments of the organization. Additionally, the architecture must
provide solutions to compatibility and integration problems with
other systems and sources of data.
The third element is integrity. This refers to the reliability,
accuracy, and completeness of the information delivered to the
end-user. Integrity may become a concern, for instance, in the
situation where a bank's loan division mistakenly inputs errone-
ous entries into its general ledger system resulting in billing er-
rors and similar problems. Organizations may consider
implementing information system audits and independent appli-
cation reviews to safeguard the integrity of its information.
Security, the fourth information technology element, essen-
tially refers to an organization's ability to prevent unauthorized
access, modification, destruction, or disclosure of information as-
sets during their creation, transmission, processing, maintenance,
or storage. Examiners are to evaluate whether the organization's
operating procedures and controls are commensurate with the
potential for and risk associated with such security breaches.
The final information technology element discussed by the
Federal Reserve in SR 98-9 is availability. Availability relates to
the delivery of information to end-users. Information technology
has effective availability when information is regularly delivered
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to the end user on a timely basis. A secondary aspect of
availability concerns whether an organization has contingency
plans in place to limit disruptions caused by human error or
intervention, natural disaster, or utility or communications
failuresThe five somewhat ill-defined elements set forth in SR 98-
9 are intended to be flexible tools to facilitate consideration of the
risks associated with information technology. To be most useful,
these elements need to be incorporated into an effective risk
management process.
3. FDIC's Electronic Banking Safety and Soundness
Examination Procedures
Historically, banks and other financial institutions have
provided limited electronic capabilities in the form of phone
banking, ATMs, and automated clearing-house systems. New
technology, however, has resulted in a vast array of electronic
capabilities ranging from elaborate computer networks to infor-
mational and transactional web sites to electronic bill payment
systems.
The FDIC has segregated these new electronic capabilities,
particularly bank web sites, into three categories based on their
degree of functionality and interactivity." Level I systems are
those "Information-Only Systems" which allow access to basic
marketing and publicly available information, as well as the
transmission of non-sensitive electronic mail. In Level I systems,
the publisher, usually the bank, is communicating information
that historically would have been made available through print
or similar media. These systems present the least risk to financial
institutions with respect to security breaches and other failures
and are, therefore, subject to the least stringent FDIC examina-
tions.
Level II systems, "Electronic Information Transfer Sys-
tems," are interactive in that they allow the transmission of sensi-
11. See FDIC: Electronic Banking Safety and Soundness Examination Proce-
dures Gune 1998), (visited March 5, 2000) <http://www.fdic.gov/regulations
/information/electronic/elecbank.pdf>.
2000]
70 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
tive messages, documents, or files between financial institutions
and their clients. This category includes systems that allow sensi-
tive or confidential electronic mail between banks and customers,
data or files to be downloaded by customers from a bank's net-
work, and bank web sites that permit customers to submit online
loan or deposit account applications. Level II systems are subject
to more significant examinations than are Level I systems.
Level III systems, "Fully Transactional Information Sys-
tems," are those that allow Level I and Level II activities as well
as online account information, fund transfers between accounts,
and electronic bill payment among other things. Level III sys-
tems are subject to the most thorough FDIC examination proce-
dures.
Clearly, developing technology has improved the opportu-
nities available to financial institutions. Unfortunately, along
with these opportunities have come a variety of new risks. Some
risks are obvious such as the possibility of newly deployed tech-
nology quickly becoming obsolete. By contrast, technology-
related risks may also be unexpected such as the risk that new
technology will not suit the demands of consumers. Some tech-
nology-related incidents may be particularly dangerous for fi-
nancial institutions given their highly interconnected computer
systems. For instance, system attacks, either internal or external,
may be undertaken to disrupt services, access databases and in-
formation resources, or for purposes of financial gain. These at-
tacks may even be motivated simply by the challenge of
overcoming a bank's security systems. Another technology-
related problem facing financial institutions is the possible failure
of one or more participants in a payment system or outsourcing
arrangement. The consequences of such a failure could quickly
extend beyond the failing party resulting in reputation damage
and lost confidence on a much broader scale.
In response to these technology-related risks, the FDIC has
emphasized the need to develop effective risk management pro-
grams. Risk management is the ongoing process of identifying,
measuring, monitoring, and managing potential risk exposure.
In particular, the FDIC has identified three general areas where
financial institutions should focus their risk management efforts.
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First, they should undertake general supervision including plan-
ning and analysis, policies and procedures, accountability and
authority, regulatory and legal compliance, human resources,
and auditing. Second, financial institutions need to consider
transaction processing matters such as authentication, information
integrity, and data confidentiality. Finally, financial institutions
need to generally consider system administration such as resource
requirements, system security, system reliability, outsourcing
policies, and contingency planning.
Even beyond these general risk management considera-
tions, there are several risk management techniques that have
specific relevance to electronic banking. Management should in-
corporate these techniques into its overall risk management pro-
gram. They include strategic planning and feasibility analysis,
incident response and preparedness, and internal routines and controls.
The importance of strategic planning and feasibility analy-
sis cannot be overstated as they relate to electronic banking. Stra-
tegic planning is the ongoing process of evolving and adapting
an organization's mission and business objectives. Feasibility
analysis, although similar, involves decisions concerning specific
proposals as opposed to overall organizational goals. Feasibility
analysis entails the determination of whether a specific proposal
will satisfy a given business objective. When completing a feasi-
bility study, a particular proposal or opportunity should be con-
sidered in three stages: (1) study, during which needs and
objectives are analyzed, and alternatives are developed based on
performance specifications; (2) design and development, during
which the best solution is identified based on technical specifica-
tions, the system is installed, policies and procedures are devel-
oped, and documentation is completed; and (3) operation, during
which the system is operated and maintained. With respect to
the electronic capabilities of financial institutions, these strategic
planning and feasibility analysis decisions are of particular im-
portance because of the significant investment and risks that may
accompany the deployment of a new technology. Consequently,
it is imperative that management, including the board of direc-
tors and other senior officers, is fully informed of the opportuni-
ties and risks related to the deployment of new technology.
20001
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Once a new technology has been set up, ongoing reviews
will be necessary to evaluate the performance of the technology
against strategic and operational objectives.
Beyond preventing problems through strategic planning
and feasibility analysis, a second function of an effective risk
management program is to respond to situations promptly in or-
der to limit their negative effects. Quick response is of even
greater importance in an era of high-speed technology and inter-
dependent computer systems where a small problem has poten-
tial to balloon quickly. Development of an effective incident
response policy should begin by assessing the risks posed to each
system; it should determine the importance and sensitivity of all
systems, applications and data sources. Additionally, the inci-
dent response policy should identify and prepare key personnel
whose expertise will be necessary to respond quickly and deci-
sively to a situation. These individuals should then be empow-
ered with the authority to respond during an incident. Another
component of an effective incident response policy is an institu-
tion's backup systems. Ideally, these backups will limit the ef-
fects of any disruption on essential systems or information
resources.
The final essential element of any technology-related risk
management program is an effective system of internal routines
and controls. Because financial institutions are especially vulner-
able to failures of and attacks on their computer systems, an ef-
fective risk management program must incorporate a system of
internal controls to protect hardware, software, information re-
sources, and electronic transmissions. One key internal control is
an effective security program including physical and system ac-
cess controls such as on-site security, system passwords, fire-
walls, encryption, and intrusion detection systems. Audit
procedures are also vital to any internal control system. The final
component of the internal control system involves educating per-
sonnel as to the importance of adhering to this system of controls.
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4. OCC's Comptroller's Handbook
on Internet Banking
In October 1999, the OCC published a specialized booklet
as part of its Comptroller's Handbook that deals solely with
Internet Banking.12 This booklet is, in some respects, very similar
to earlier FDIC and OCC publications in that it categorizes the
various types of Internet banking, discusses the nine varieties of
risk confronting banks in relation to their Internet banking activi-
ties, and sets forth a three step risk management process. In
other respects, however, the Internet Banking booklet differs from
earlier publications in the level of detail with which it addresses
internal control systems, in-house development versus outsourc-
ing of Internet services, and other issues concerning public confi-
dence in Internet banking.
The Comptroller's Handbook defines "Internet Banking"
as the systems that enable bank customers to access accounts and
general information on bank products and services through a
personal computer or other intelligent device. Internet banking
services include everything from wholesale wire transfers and
automated clearinghouse transactions to retail services such as
balance inquiry, funds transfer, and bill presentment and pay-
ment. As with many other areas of society, the Internet has
brought about revolutionary changes in the business of banking.
Several factors are driving the enormous growth of Internet
banking. In particular, the chief factor pushing the increasing use
of Internet technology has been competitive pressure. Banks
must offer Internet services or lose their customers to the compe-
tition. Another factor that has spurred the growth of Internet
banking has been the significant cost efficiencies of this new
technology. While the cost of delivering the average manual
banking transaction is more than one dollar, the cost of the aver-
age Internet transaction is about a penny. An additional driving
factor has been the geographic reach of the Internet.
12 See OCC 99-94, Internet Banking: Comptroller's Handbook (October 1999),
(visited March 5, 2000) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/intbank.pdf>.
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As mentioned above, the Comptroller's Handbook breaks
down Internet banking into three categories, similar to those dis-
cussed in the FDIC's Electronic Banking Safety and Soundness Ex-
amination Procedures. The Handbook classifies banks Internet
service offerings as informational, communicative, or transac-
tional based on their level of functionality and interactivity. As
the level of interactivity increases so does the risk of security
breaches and the need for internal control systems.
The Internet Banking booklet also discusses the risks facing
banks offering Internet services. It generally defines risk as the
potential that events, either expected or unexpected, may have an
adverse impact on the earnings or capital of a bank. The OCC
advises that all nine categories of risk (credit, compliance, foreign
exchange, interest rate, liquidity, price, reputation, transaction,
and strategic) are associated with Internet banking activities. To
minimize these risks, the OCC refers banks to the three step risk
management process discussed in Bulletin 98-3, Technology Risk
Management.
Inextricably tied to risk management processes are internal
controls. Internal control systems related to Internet banking
services should be commensurate with the level of risk presented
by the services. The required internal controls will depend on
the objectives of the bank and the types of Internet services of-
fered. It is the duty of bank management to determine the bank's
goals and objectives with respect to its Internet banking offerings
and then to establish a system of internal controls sufficient to
ensure that the goals and objectives are met.
The Internet Banking booklet also addressed the decision
whether banks should offer in-house or outsourced Internet
banking services. This decision depends on several considera-
tions. Of particular importance are the size and resources of the
bank. Larger banks with substantial resources may choose to
purchase the necessary hardware and software to offer Internet
banking. This will allow those banks the greatest ability to cus-
tomize their product offerings. On the other hand, it may be
more cost effective for smaller institutions to simply have some-
one else offer these services on their behalf. It is important to
remember, however, that even if the service is handled by an
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outside vendor, the bank is still responsible for monitoring the
security, reliability and general performance of the service ven-
dor. Therefore, should a bank choose to outsource its Internet
services, it should enter into a formal service agreement with the
vendor that clearly establishes all of the rights and responsibili-
ties of the parties.
The final segment of the OCC's Internet Banking booklet
discusses several issues relating to consumer and business confi-
dence in Internet banking. Public confidence is, obviously, essen-
tial to the success of Internet banking. With this in mind, banks
must employ policies, procedures and technology directed at eas-
ing consumer apprehension. Specifically, banks need to address
consumer concerns including: security, authentication, trust, non-
repudiation, privacy, and availability.
5. Security
A primary fear in electronic commerce is the underlying
security of the system. In the cyberworld, there are no originals.
Duplicates are generally an identical match of the electronic im-
pulses or 0's and l's that constitute the original. Data and infor-
mation, stored in such form, is subject to manipulation or
destruction, either intentionally or unintentionally. Where banks
and money are concerned, the importance of security is even
greater. The regulators recognize the risk and not only strongly
encourage banks to address the risk, but also focus on it strongly
during the examination and evaluation process.
a. Cyber-Terrorists vs. Infrastructure
OCC Bulletin 99-9, Infrastructure Threats from Cyber-
Terrorists, discusses the threat to financial institutions and the
general infrastructure of our society (including telecommunica-
tions, energy, banking and finance, transportation, utilities, and
emergency services) presented by Cyber-terrorists. 13 The Bulletin
13. See OCC 99-9, Infrastructure Threats from Cyber-Terrorists (March 5, 1999),
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defines Cyber-terrorism as "the use of computing resources
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government,
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of
political or social objectives." It can take a variety of forms in-
cluding commercial espionage or employee sabotage. Cyber-
terrorism can be a single catastrophic attack or a series of coordi-
nated but seemingly independent attacks.
Historically, the most significant threats to the computer
security of financial institutions came from internal attacks by
disgruntled employees. Today, however, the threat has become
far broader with the advent of the Internet and our more highly
automated society. While technological advances have resulted
in increased efficiency and improved service, they have also
made our infrastructures increasingly automated and interde-
pendent. Consequently, the destruction or debilitation of public
utilities, for instance, could result in the cascading destruction of
our banking and finance systems. It is these types of problems
which the OCC intended to address in Bulletin 99-9.
With respect to external attacks, the OCC emphasizes the
need for banks to install strong intrusion detection systems capa-
ble of detecting and recording attempts to break into their com-
puter systems. Additionally, the OCC stresses the importance of
reporting suspected cyber-crimes and computer intrusions to the
FBI Computer Crimes unit and to the Suspicious Activity Report-
ing System in order to allow the detection of patterns or related
incidents.
Regarding internal attacks, the OCC suggests that banks
implement a physical security program that limits access to com-
puting and information resources. As an additional layer of pro-
tection, the OCC recommends the use of user IDs, passwords,
anti-virus programs, and monitoring of computer and Internet
usage.
The OCC's final advice relates to indirect damage to banks
resulting from attacks on other parts of the infrastructure. In par-
ticular, the OCC advises the use of back-up plans and contin-
gency plans to reduce disruptions caused by failures in other
available in 1999 WL 137721.
[Vol. 4
CYBERBANKING
areas of the infrastructure.
b. Information Security for Networks
In 1996, the Federal Reserve, after interviewing a cross-
section of financial institutions, securities firms, CPA firms, and
other industry related firms, published SR 97-32 outlining what it
considered to be prudent and effective security measures related
to computer networks.' 4 These measures were designed to pro-
tect information and ensure its integrity, availability, and confi-
dentiality.
SR 97-32 emphasized several key points. First, the Federal
Reserve stressed the need for a strong information security pro-
gram establishing the necessary structure and accountability to
manage risks and foster awareness of the importance of informa-
tion security. An effective information security program should
involve active board and management oversight, established
policies and procedures, measurement and monitoring systems,
and a system of internal controls.
Like OCC Bulletin 99-9, the Federal Reserve's SR 97-32 also
discussed the vulnerability of internal network systems. The pa-
per suggested that internal attacks could potentially be the most
damaging to a financial institution as the institution's own per-
sonnel, including consultants as well as employees, may have
authorized access to critical information and computer resources.
To limits these problems, the Federal Reserve suggested the use
of background checks of information technology personnel such
as system administrators, telecommunications support staff, sys-
tem programmers and any other personnel with access to sensi-
tive information.
The Federal Reserve also suggested that organizations
should encrypt confidential information, particularly data in-
tended to be transmitted over public networks. The paper
warned that even "dedicated" or "leased" lines may not provide
14. Federal Reserve Board, SR 97-32 (Dec. 4, 1997), (visited March 5, 2000)
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SRLETTERS/1997/SR9732.HTM>.
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
adequate privacy as they still use the same infrastructure as the
public networks and are, therefore, still subject to the same at-
tacks. Additionally, SR 97-32 warned institutions against having
Internet sites which contain a link directly into the institution's
own internal network. Such a path may provide unauthorized
individuals with a way to attack the institution's internal net-
work and information assets.
Finally, the paper pointed out, quite practically, that secu-
rity programs designed to protect networks from security
breaches may require dedication of significant resources. It is the
responsibility of senior management to evaluate the costs and
benefits of such programs in deciding how to best allocate the
institution's resources.
c. FDIC FIL 68-99
In July 1999, the FDIC published FIL 68-99 in an effort to
provide financial institutions and examiners with background
information and guidance on various risk-assessment tools and
practices related to information security.15 The paper described
the steps for establishing a sound information security policy
starting with a thorough and proactive risk assessment and con-
cluding with the creation of an ongoing security program incor-
porating prevention, detection, and response components.
According to the paper, an effective policy begins with an
assessment of the risks confronting the organization's informa-
tion and technology resources. This process involves evaluating
the threats presented by serious hackers, interested computer
novices, dishonest vendors and competitors, disgruntled current
or former employees, and even agents of espionage. As the FDIC
pointed out, the Internet has provided a wealth of information to
both banks and hackers, allowing the average Internet user to
quickly find information describing how to break into an institu-
tion's systems using known security flaws and/or software bugs.
FIL 68-99 describes various mechanisms which hackers may use
15. See FDIC, FIL 68-99 Uuly 7,1999), available in 1999 WL 475573.
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to attack an institution's computer systems. Systems have been
attacked using everything from stolen passwords to simple com-
puter viruses to Trojan horse programs to Internet Protocol
spoofing.
According to the FDIC, the first step in addressing these
threats is to evaluate where an institution is vulnerable and then
to develop a program that addresses these weaknesses. Such a
program should involve three components: prevention, detec-
tion, and response. Regarding prevention, the FDIC suggests
that institutions use a combination of vulnerability assessment
tools that scan networks, servers, firewalls, routers, and applica-
tions for known security flaws and software bugs as well as
penetration analysis tests in which independent or internal per-
sonnel attempt to break into the institution's systems. The FDIC
also suggested using intrusion detection systems that essentially
act as burglar alarms reporting potential attacks or intrusions to
the appropriate personnel. The final requirement of a sound in-
formation security program is an incident response strategy that
identifies what constitutes a break-in or system misuse, estab-
lishes procedures for reporting incidents to management, the
board of directors, legal counsel, and law enforcement agents,
and empowers personnel to respond to such incidents.
C. Compliance
The laws governing consumer compliance generally have
not changed in recognition of the delivery of banking services
over the Internet. Accordingly, banks must determine an appro-
priate method of dealing with consumer compliance issues when
there are no paper-based documents and there is no face-to-face
interaction with the customer.
It is useful to think about compliance depending upon the
level of electronic activities the institution engages in. There is
one set of issues when a financial institution is simply distribut-
ing information about itself or its products. There is another set
if the customer is able to engage in banking transactions. There is
yet a third set if the customer is able to engage in non-banking
transactions, such as securities or insurance transactions. Finally,
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there are additional issues if the bank merely provides "links" or
access to the sites of third-parties where an array of products or
services may be purchased.
1. Compliance Issues for Advertising and
Information Only Systems
As a preliminary matter, it is probably appropriate to use
the working assumption that virtually all web page data is adver-
tising. It is thus proper to consider web sites that provide infor-
mation as being equivalent to a pamphlet or similar product,
with the advertising requirements being applicable to the entire
document.
As a general matter, under both state and federal law it is
illegal to engage in unfair or deceptive advertising. Accordingly,
as a preliminary matter, web page data should be accurate. As
an example, both the FTC and the bank regulatory agencies are
concerned that privacy statements and policies accurately reflect
the practices of the institution.
The home page of the bank's web site must display the of-
ficial advertising statement, unless one of the exceptions to the
requirement is available.16 Subsidiary web pages should also
generally be thought of as advertisements, unless one of the ex-
ceptions applies. Accordingly, the words "Member FDIC" or the
FDIC symbol should appear on the top level web page, and on
other pages that can reasonably be considered to be advertise-
ments. Institutions may want to consider whether the symbol
should appear on other pages if there is a reasonably likelihood
that parties will be entering the site through other pages, whether
or not they could be considered advertising. The official bank or
savings association signsj7 are not required to be displayed.
The "Equal Housing Lender" logo or legend, or other
permissible disclosure of non-discrimination policy, should also
appear if the institution is advertising credit products that are
16. See 12 C.F.R. § 328.3 (1999).
17. See id. at § 328.2.
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subject to the Fair Housing Act.18
If there are materials describing rates on deposit accounts
or loan products, the bank will need to comply with Truth in Sav-
ings and Truth in Lending obligations.
2. Compliance Issues for On-Line
Depository Services
An additional layer of complexity is added when the bank
begins to provide access to deposit account information and
permits the customer to initiate transactions in those accounts.
There are four major statutory and regulatory requirements to be
addressed, the EFT Act (Reg. E), the Expedited Funds Availabil-
ity Act (Reg. CC), the Truth in Savings Act (Reg. DD) and Federal
Reserve requirements (Reg. D). The general focus of these regu-
lations is on disclosures, delivery of required statements, accu-
racy of interest rates, notices, and error resolution.
a. Disclosures Generally
Disclosures must be "clear and conspicuous." As this re-
quirement is adapted to the Internet, banks must be sensitive to
what a customer actually sees and how the customer sees it.
Pointers and hot links may be useful methods of assuring that the
customer actually views required disclosures.
The regulators are rapidly moving to the point where dis-
closures can be made electronically rather than in writing on
physical paper so long as the customer agrees to electronic deliv-
ery. To satisfy the disclosure obligation, the disclosure must gen-
erally be capable of being viewed, downloaded and printed by
18. See id. at § 338.3(a) which states:
Any bank which directly or through third parties engages in
any form of advertising of any loan for the purpose of purchasing,
constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling or
any loan secured by a dwelling shall prominently indicate in such
advertisement, in a manner appropriate to the advertising medium
and format utilized, that the bank makes loans without regard to
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap or familial status.
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the customer. To assure that customers using media where print-
ing is not possible, banks should provide a mechanism where the
written disclosures can be mailed to the customer at an address
to be designated by the customer.
Because the regulations on occasion require that certain
disclosures be delivered at a specific time (e.g., at the time an ap-
plication is delivered), the institution should assure that there is a
mechanism to satisfy this requirement through mandatory links
or other methods that will assure automatic presentation of re-
quired disclosures.
b. Need for an Account Agreement
As a preliminary matter, banks must assure that the cus-
tomer has provided appropriate authorization to engage in
online banking activities. Most banks are requiring a separate
"online banking" agreement, that may be a written document
maintained by the bank, or an electronic document posted on the
site that the customer must "click through" and accept in order to
commence the online banking activities. Whatever method is
used must be sufficient to bind the customer, for online banking
typically depends upon user identification numbers and pass-
words, and the bank must be in a position to rely upon the user
of those identifiers in fulfilling transactions and requests.
The bank may also use this online account agreement to
provide many of the disclosures called for under the various
regulations discussed below where appropriate.19
Part of the account agreement may address the consent to
the electronic delivery of notices and disclosures. It may be ap-
propriate for the agreement to provide a mechanism for the cus-
tomer to "opt out" of electronic delivery and receive paper
disclosures in person or by mail.
19. As an example of an extensive account agreement and disclosure format,
see Wells Fargo's online banking agreement at: <https://banking.wellsfargo.com/
common/html/wibdisc.html> (visited March, 2000).
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c. Need to Know Your Customer
Although the banking agencies dropped their proposed
"Know Your Customer" rule in mid-1999, the underlying statu-
tory requirements that led to the proposal are still present. The
proposed rule was promulgated on December 7, 199820 and was
withdrawn on March 29, 1999,21 after the agency received over
250,000 comments in opposition to the proposed rule.
First, banks have an obligation to file Suspicious Activity
Reports whenever it detects known or suspected criminal viola-
tions of federal law or a suspicious transaction related to a money
laundering activity or a violation of the Bank Secrecy Act. The
reports must be filed with the appropriate law enforcement
agencies and the Department of the Treasury. 22
Second, banks have an obligation to comply with the Bank
Secrecy Act, which imposes strict record keeping and reporting
requirements with respect to transactions in currency and mone-
tary instruments.23
Third, banks have a requirement not to engage in busi-
ness, directly or indirectly, in property in which any person in a
country embargoed by the Treasury Department's Office of For-
eign Assets Control (OFAC), such as Cuba, North Korea, Iran,
Iraq, Libya and Sudan, as well as any of the 2000-plus Specially
Designated Nationals, has an interest. The Internet is interna-
tional, almost by definition, and the bank must be sensitive re-
garding with whom it is doing business. Enforcement in this
area is quite robust, with high civil and criminal penalties.24
20. 63 Fed. Reg. 67,529 (1998).
21. 64 Fed. Reg. 14,845 (1999).
22. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 353 (1999).
23. See 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1994); 31 C.F.R. § 103 (1999). See also 12 C.F.R. § 326.8
(1999).
24. See 31 C.F.R. Chapter V (1999). For example, 31 C.F.R. 500.201(a) provides
as follows:
All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as spe-
cifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person,
agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regula-
tions, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if either such
transactions are by, or on behalf of, or pursuant to the direction of
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The recent money laundering hearings involving the Bank
of New York and accounts with Russian correspondent banks
and companies highlight the critical need to know basic informa-
tion about customers. Failure to establish systems and controls in
this area could be particularly damaging to the institution.
d. Electronic Funds Transfers (Regulation E)
The Electronic Funds Transfer Act25 and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation E26 apply whenever online banking sys-
tems provide for transactions that will debit or credit a
consumer's account.
In general, Regulation E requires disclosures to be clear
and readily understandable, in a form that the consumer may
keep.27 Depository institutions may satisfy this requirement by
the electronic delivery of these disclosures so long as the con-
sumer agrees to such delivery.28
When a customer signs up for new banking services, the
customer must be provided with the Regulation E disclosures if
the services are subject to terms and conditions different from
those that have previously been properly disclosed to the cus-
tomer.29 Accordingly, many institutions are including the Regu-
lation E disclosures in their online account agreements or are
separately providing the disclosures when the customer initiates
online banking services.
any designated foreign country, or any national thereof, or such
transactions involve property in which any designated foreign
country, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since the ef-
fective date of this section had any interest of any nature whatso-
ever, direct or indirect:
(1) All transfers of credit and all payments between, by,
through, or to any banking institution or banking institutions
wheresoever located, with respect to any property subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States or by any person (including a bank-
ing institution) subject to the jurisdiction of the United States...
25.15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
26.12 C.F.R. § 205 (1999)
27. See id. at § 205.4.
28. See id. at § 205.4(c)(2).
29. See C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary § 205.7(a)-4.
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Regulation E generally provides for a receipt requirement
whenever a customer initiates an electronic funds transfer at an
electronic terminal.30 However, there are certain exceptions. As
an analogous device to a telephone, receipts should not be neces-
sary for transactions initiated by a consumer from a personal
computer.31
Important in connection with bill payment systems is the
requirement that there be written authorization for pre-
authorized transfers from a consumer's account, or that the writ-
ing be "similarly authenticated." 32 The Official Staff Commen-
tary specifically permits authentication through a home banking
system. "To satisfy this requirements of this section, there must
be some means to identify the consumer (such as a security code)
and to make available a paper copy of the authorization (auto-
matically or upon request)." 33
Importantly, 12 C.F.R. § 205.6 governs the limitations of
the consumer's liability in connection with unauthorized transac-
tions or loss or theft of an access device (which would include the
user identification information and password). Notwithstanding
the general desire to allow the bank to rely upon all transactions
and instructions initiated with the consumer's identifying infor-
mation, Federal law will impose limits on the customer's liability.
Where customers are using online systems, the bank should be
aware that notices of loss, theft or unauthorized access may occur
electronically, and the bank should have systems in place to re-
ceive and act promptly upon such notices.
e. Truth in Savings (Regulation DD)
The Truth in Savings Act34 and the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation DD35 require financial institutions to make
30. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.9(a) (1999).
31. See C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary § 205.2(h)-1.
32. 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b) (1999).
33. C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary § 205.10(b)-5.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (1994)
35. 12 C.F.R. § 230 (1999)
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meaningful disclosures to consumers regarding the costs and in-
terest rates paid on deposit accounts. If information about de-
posit products is made available, proper advertising disclosures
must be made in accordance with each of the requirements of the
Regulation. There is no exemption for information made avail-
able over the institution's web site.
Regulation DD contains important requirements as to the
timing of certain disclosures. For example, account disclosures
must be provided before an account is opened.36 Further, disclo-
sures must be made "clearly and conspicuously in writing, and in
a form the consumer may keep."37 The Federal Reserve has is-
sued a proposed rule that would allow electronic delivery of
these disclosures.38 The proposal contains extensive details re-
garding how to satisfy the timing and other requirements of
Regulation DD. Until the proposal is adopted, however, the elec-
tronic disclosures will have to be supplemented by paper disclo-
sures. A possible alternative would be electronic delivery to an
email address if the recipient confirms that the email has been
received and printed out. Alternatively, fax delivery should be
sufficient if the recipient confirms that the fax has been received
in paper form. In any event, the account should not be opened
until the receipt of the written disclosure is assured.
If the web site contains account information, it should be
monitored for recency, accuracy and compliance. Information
should be clearly dated, and appropriate disclaimers should be
placed on web site material indicating that rates may have
changed, and indicating how the customer may obtain updated
information.
f. Expedited Funds Availability
The Expedited Funds Availability Act and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation CC39 require financial institutions to
36. See id. at § 230.4(a).
37. Id. at § 230.3(a).
38. See 64 Fed. Reg. 49,740-49,752 (1999).
39.12 C.F.R. § 229 (1999).
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comply with certain requirements with respect to the availability
of funds and to make specific disclosures regarding their policies.
These requirements still apply, even though the customer may be
dealing with the institution electronically. As a general matter,
the disclosures required by 12 C.F.R. § 229.16 as to funds avail-
ability policies must be made prior to the opening of a new ac-
count. The Federal Reserve will permit these disclosures to be
made electronically if the customer agrees.40 The disclosure must
be in textual form and must be in a form the customer may keep.
Generally this requires that the disclosure be capable of being
downloaded or printed. Accordingly, the institution should pe-
riodically test its site to assure that disclosures meet the require-
ments of this section.
g. Regulation D (Reserve Requirements)
Regulation D41 imposes reserve requirements on accounts
maintained at the institution. The actual reserve requirement de-
pends upon the type of account. For savings and MMDA ac-
counts which are subject to the six transaction limit, electronic
withdrawals, electronic transfers or payments to third parties ini-
tiated by the depositor count against the limit.
3. Compliance Issues for Lending and Leasing Services
Providing online lending and leasing services brings into
play another layer of complex regulation, and accordingly re-
quires strict attention to the various compliance issues. Again,
the most serious issues relate to disclosures. There are a series of
statutes to be addressed, including the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act (Reg. B),42 the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Reg. C),43 the
Consumer Leasing Act (Reg. ), 44 the Truth in Lending Act (Reg.
40. See C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary § 229.15(a)-i.
41.12 C.F.R. § 204 (1999).
42. Id. at § 202.
43. Id. at § 203.
44. Id. at § 213.
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Z),45 the Unfair or Deceptive Practices Act (Reg. AA)46, the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act (Reg. BB),47 the Fair Credit Reporting
Act48 and the Fair Housing Act49.
a. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z)
The Truth in Lending Act5 o and the Federal Reserve
Board's Regulation Z51 are designed to promote the informed use
of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about the terms and
costs of such credit. There are specific disclosure and related re-
quirements for both open-end and closed end credit, all of which
will come into play if the bank offers credit over the Internet.
Disclosures are required in connection with advertisements5 2 and
whenever there is a solicitation or application to provide credit.5 3
Importantly, advertisements include any commercial message in
any medium that promotes, directly or indirectly, a credit trans-
action.-M "Messages inviting, offering, or otherwise announcing
generally to prospective customers the availability of credit
transactions whether in visual, oral, or print media, are covered
by Regulation Z." 5 Web pages would clearly fall within the am-
bit of this description.
Disclosures are required to be provided "clearly and con-
spicuously in writing in a form that the consumer may keep." 56
There are important exceptions to this requirement, including
certain specific disclosures for credit and charge card applica-
tions, home equity disclosures, alternative summary billing
45. Id. at § 226.
46. Id. at § 228.
47. Id. at § 227.
48. Id. at § 228.
49.42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
50. The Truth in Lending Act is part of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. 1601 (1994).
51. 12 C.F.R. § 226 (1999).
52. See id. at §§ 226.16, 226.29.
53. See id. at §§ 226.5, 226.5a, 226.5b.
54. See id. at § 226.2(a)(2).
55. C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary § 226.2(2)(a)(2)-1.
56.12 C.F.R. 226.5(a)(1) (1999).
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rights statements, credit and charge card renewal disclosures,
and disclosures about payment requirements. These specific dis-
closures, while they must be clear and conspicuous and in writ-
ing, need not be in a form the consumer can keep, opening the
way for their electronic disclosure.5 7 The Federal Reserve has
proposed allowing electronic delivery of essentially all of the
Regulation Z disclosures.58 The proposal contains extensive de-
tails regarding how to satisfy the timing and other requirements
of Regulation Z. Until the proposal is adopted, however, the
electronic disclosures (other than the exceptions noted above)
will have to be supplemented by paper disclosures.
Interestingly, Regulation Z does allow electronic delivery
of periodic statements if the customer agrees.5 9
b. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(Regulation B)
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act6° and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation B61 are designed to promote the avail-
ability of credit for all creditworthy applicants regardless of race,
color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, or age, or cer-
tain other factors. It prohibits credit practices that discriminate
on the basis of any of these factors, and imposes certain other re-
quirements.
To the extent the online system relates to extending credit,
all of the Regulation B requirements would be applicable. Of
particular importance are two specific items. First, if a credit ap-
plication is taken online, it constitutes a written application un-
der 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(e), and second, if the application relates to
the purchase or refinancing of a dwelling, the institution must
request the specific information provided in 12 C.F.R. § 202.13
(race or national origin, sex, marital status and age). In general,
57. See 12 C.F.R. 226.5(a)(1), n.8.
58. See 64 Fed. Reg. 49,740-49,752 (1999).
59. See C.F.R. Official Staff Commentary 226.5(b)(2)(ii)-3.
60. Title VII of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1994)
61.12 C.F.R. § 202 (1999).
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online credit applications must satisfy the requirements of 12
C.F.R. § 202.5.
If the application is taken online with video capability, the
application will be treated as if it were in person for the purposes
of 12 C.F.R. § 202.13(b). That is, if the customer elects not to
complete the requested information regarding race or national
origin, the institution is to note on the form such information to
the extent it is able to do so. Without video capacity, the applica-
tion will be treated as if it were received by mail.
c. Fair Housing Act
As noted above, an institution that advertises on-
line credit products that are subject to the Fair Housing
Act62 must display the Equal Housing Lender logotype
and legend or other permissible disclosure of its non-
discrimination policy.63
d. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(Regulation C)
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act64 and the Federal Re-
serve Board's Regulation C65 impose data collection requirements
on financial institutions designed to help determine whether in-
stitutions are serving the needs of their communities, to identify
possible discriminatory lending patterns and enforce anti-
discrimination statutes, and to assist public officials in distribut-
ing public-sector investments.
62.42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
63. See 12 C.F.R. § 338.3(a) which provides as follows:
Any bank which directly or through third parties engages in
any form of advertising of any loan for the purpose of purchasing,
constructing, improving, repairing, or maintaining a dwelling or
any loan secured by a dwelling shall prominently indicate in such
advertisement, in a manner appropriate to the advertising medium
and format utilized, that the bank makes loans without regard to
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap or familial status.
64. 12 U.S.C. § 2801 (1994).
65.12 C.F.R. § 203 (1999).
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Institutions are required to collect data regarding applica-
tions for and, originations or purchases of home purchase and
home improvement loans. Among other things, required data
includes the type and purpose of the loan, the location of the
property, the race or national origin and sex of the borrower, the
gross annual income of the borrower, and the type of action
taken with respect to the loan.66 Similar to the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, if applications are taken online with video capabil-
ity, the applications will be treated as if they were in person for
the purposes of 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b). That is, if the customer elects
not to complete the requested information regarding race or na-
tional origin, the institution is to note on the form such informa-
tion to the extent it is able to do so. Without video capacity, the
application will be treated as if it were received by mail.
e. The Fair Credit Reporting Act
12 U.S.C. 1681 imposes strict requirements on entities that
collect, transmit and use information on consumers for the pur-
pose of making (or allowing others to make) credit and certain
other decisions. The definitional sections in the Act are of ex-
treme importance as they define consumer report, consumer re-
porting agency, and the various other entities that can be brought
within the scope of the act by virtue of their collection, transmis-
sion or use of consumer information.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act allows banks to gather and
use their own experiential information in making credit deci-
sions, and allows them to share certain of that information with
credit reporting agencies. It also allows banks to use information
from credit reporting agencies in making credit and certain other
decisions, but imposes certain obligations on banks when they
deny credit or access to other services or opportunities on the ba-
sis of information contained in the credit report. A bank can be-
come a credit reporting agency and, thus, become subject to the
requirements associated with maintaining accurate information
66. See id. at § 203.4.
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and allowing consumers to correct erroneous information.
Recently the OCC has expressed some concern about
banks withholding information from credit reporting agencies.
While there is no statutory obligation for banks to share the in-
formation they may have obtained based upon direct transac-
tioris with the customer, the OCC has indicated that as accurate
credit information is of benefit to the overall credit industry, it
would look unfavorably upon a lender that refused to share basic
information with the credit reporting agencies.
The FCRA obligations must be considered by banks when
developing privacy statements for their customers. Banks will
clearly want to reserve the right to share permissible experiential
information with the credit reporting agencies, even though they
might be willing to commit to their customers not to share infor-
mation with third-party marketers.
4. Compliance Issues for Non-Deposit Investment
Products
The law on the sale and delivery of non-deposit invest-
ment products is beyond the scope of this outline. However,
from a banking law perspective, there are two primary require-
ments that should be considered whenever a bank is involved in
providing information regarding non-deposit investment prod-
ucts through its web site.
First, there must be full disclosure of the uninsured nature
of these products. The February 15, 1994, Interagency Statement on
Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products67 provides important
guidance to banks with respect to offering and selling insurance
and securities products to their customers. While the Statement
was not drafted with the Internet offering of such products in
mind, the principles contained in the Statement should properly
be adapted to online advertisement and offerings.
According to the Statement:
67. (visited on March 7,2000)
<http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/94%2D13a.pdf>.
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Sales activities for nondeposit investment products
should ensure that customers for these products
are clearly and fully informed of the nature and
risks associated with these products. In particular,
where nondeposit investment products are rec-
ommended or sold to retail customers, depository
institutions should ensure that customers are fully
informed that the products:
- are not insured by the FDIC;
- are not deposits or other obligations of the in-
stitution and are not guaranteed by the institution;
and,
- are subject to investment risks, including pos-
sible loss of the principal invested.
Moreover, sales activities involving these invest-
ment products should be designed to minimize the
possibility of customer confusion and to safeguard
the institution from liability under the applicable
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws,
which, among other things, prohibit materially
misleading or inaccurate representations in con-
nection with the sale of securities.
Accordingly, the notice of "not FDIC-insured, not guaran-
teed, possible loss of principal" should appropriately appear
when the customer enters the online pages where non-insured
products are discussed, and the message should be appropriately
repeated when the customer reaches points at the site where
"buy" or "invest" decisions are made.
Further, in order to comply with the general intent of the
Statement, the pages dealing with non-insured products should
be segregated from those dealing with insured deposit products.
"Segregation" in this light means some appropriate separation
2000]
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from the deposit pages, forcing the user to exit those pages where
deposit products are discussed and entering a new area where it
is clear that there is an entirely new subject matter. Again, the
disclosures of "not FDIC-insured, not guaranteed, possible loss of
principal" help enforce the segregation concept if delivered upon
entry into this new area.
III. BEYOND BASIC BANKING: WHAT ELSE IS PERMISSIBLE?
The OCC has been quite aggressive in defining permissible
incidents to banking. While the general OCC rule on allowing
banks to conduct any activity electronically that it could other-
wise permissibly engage in is quite broad,68 on a series of occa-
sions the OCC has provided specific amplification to permissible
banking activities. Many of these appear in the OCC rulings on
permissible minority investments by banks, where one of the re-
quirements is that the entity must engage only in activities per-
missible for the bank itself.69
A. Electronic Money
Nothing seems quite as central to the business of banking
as handling and dealing with money. While banks have not been
in a position to issue their own currency for many years, the OCC
has exhibited a willingness to let banks create electronic money
and create and participate in various payment systems involving
such electronic money.
In general, electronic money refers to the information that
represents value that can be used for the purchase of goods or
services. A party will exchange some form of "real" money (be it
in the form of cash, check or credit card purchase) for the elec-
tronic value. At some point, the holder of the electronic value
can surrender the value for "real" money. There are a variety of
types of electronic money systems.
68. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1019 (1999).
69. See infra discussion in Part IWl.A.
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In an Order dated August 19, 1996, the OCC allowed
Huntington Bank to invest in a stored-value/smart card system
for universities, hospitals and other self-contained geographic
locations.70 Among other things, the bank contemplated receiv-
ing and holding the funds paid for the value associated with the
cards, and standing behind the obligation to redeem the cards or
assure payment to parties accepting the value in transactions.
In another Order, dated December 2, 1996, the OCC al-
lowed several banks to invest in Mondex, the electronic money
product developed primarily by National Westminster Bank in
England.7 This particular order involved the investment by four
U.S. banks in Mondex, U.S.A. The proposal contemplated that
the electronic money created under the system could circulate
among participants until surrendered for redemption. The prod-
uct hearkens back, in some ways, to the early days in this country
where banks issued their own notes and such notes circulated as
currency.
A more recent letter confirms that a bank may directly ac-
quire a non-controlling, minority interest in a Delaware corpora-
tion and thereby acquire, indirectly, a non-controlling minority
interest in the corporation's sole subsidiary engaged in providing
stored value systems. Apparently, the request involved a bank
that wished to obtain a minority interest in the Huntington
stored value/smart card program mentioned above.72 The recent
OCC letter indicated that the venture had established stored
value/smart card systems for fourteen customers, including
twelve universities.
On May 10, 1996, the OCC approved an investment by a
bank in an entity engaged in the design, development, marketing
and maintenance of a network for electronic funds transfers and
electronic data interchange. The purpose, among other things,
70. OCC Interpretive Letter 737 (August 19,1996), available in 1996 WL 544181.
71. OCC Conditional Approval Letter 220, Notcies of Wells Fargo Bank et al of
Intent to Establish an Operating Subsidiary Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 5.34 to Become a
Member of Limited Liability Companies operating a Stored Value System (Decem-
ber 2,1996), available in 1996 WL 742601.
72. OCC Interpretive Letter 737, supra note 69.
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was to facilitate and transact electronic commerce and marketing
software products. Part of the activities would involve the trans-
fer and settlement of financial obligations.73
In a novel order, the OCC approved an application for a
bank to design, build and operate and electronic toll booth. Ac-
cording to the OCC, the bank would serve as a focal point in
transactions where money was paid and received, something
within the core powers of banks.74
The issuance of electronic money creates a series of issues
under other statutes. These include issues under laws and regu-
lations affecting deposit insurance, electronic funds transfers and
Regulation E, reserve requirements and state escheat laws.
1. Deposit Insurance
In General Counsel Opinion No. 8,75 the FDIC issued a
lengthy opinion discussing whether stored value card arrange-
ments constituted accounts for which federal deposit insurance
would be required. Although the technical descriptions of the
various stored value card and electronic money systems is
somewhat strained, the Opinion generally provides that unless
the bank is creating a separate account for the customer with the
intent and the ability to track the funds in that account, an in-
sured deposit relationship is created. Systems that provide such
capacity may be somewhat unusual; however, the FDIC clearly
provides the flexibility to create an insured deposit relationship if
desired.
If the relationship between the bank as issuer of the elec-
tronic money and the individual or entity holding the electronic
money is not an insured account relationship, the holder of the
electronic money would be a general unsecured creditor of the
issuer. This means that if the issuer were a bank, and the bank
failed, the creditor would fall behind depositors in the priority
73. OCC Interpretive Letter 732 (May 10,1996), available in 1996 WL 413710.
74. OCC Interpretive Letter 731 (uly 1,1996), available in 1996 WL 413705.
75. FDIC, General Counsel opinion No. 8 UJuly 16,1996).
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scheme, and perhaps would receive less than full payment with
respect to the claim.
2. Electronic Funds Transfers
Stored value systems and electronic money arrangements
create issues under the Electronic Funds Transfer Act76 and Regu-
lation E of the Federal Reserve. 77 The basic issue is whether there
is a consumer account created that may be accessed through elec-
tronic funds transfers. If so, there is a series of disclosure re-
quirements, dispute resolution procedures, limitations on
liability and other matters that must be dealt with.
The Federal Reserve has attempted to address how the
EFT and Regulation E requirements would apply to stored value
cards and electronic money systems, and until now has been un-
able to adopt final regulations providing guidance. In 1996, the
Federal Reserve issued proposed regulations78 that would have
exempted small denomination systems and imposed minimal
disclosure obligations on systems dealing with larger values.
The Federal Reserve has apparently recognized that applying all
of the Regulation E requirements makes little sense to many of
these systems, due not only to technical problems but also the
realization that the provisions provide little meaningful benefit.
In general, making appropriate disclosures will be of key impor-
tance.
3. Reserve Requirements
Banks should recognize that in the event they participate
in electronic money systems where they will be holding funds,
they will be required to deal with the reserve requirements con-
tained in Regulation D.79 While it might theoretically be possible
to structure the funds so that they are held in a time deposit or
76.15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1994).
77. 12 C.F.R. § 205 (1999).
78. See 61 Fed. Reg. 19,696 (1996).
79.12 C.F.R. § 204 (1999).
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other form of account with less than full reserve requirements,
care should be taken in recognizing and dealing with the issue.
4. Escheat Statutes
Virtually every state has some form of statute requiring
that unclaimed property be turned over to the state. With elec-
tronic money and stored value systems, there will inevitably be
funds remaining that have not been used and have not been re-
deemed.
Institutions have adopted various approaches for han-
dling the escheat issue. Certain systems impose a monthly fee,
similar to an "inactive account" charge. Many electronic money
systems have a security feature that provides that the funds must
be used by a date certain. Certain of the issuers in such programs
take the position that the electronic money system is simply the
right to participate in a payment system. Accordingly, when that
right "expires" there is no right to reclaim unused funds, there-
fore, there is nothing to be escheated to the state. It is too soon to
have definitive answers on the viability of these approaches.
B. Bill Payment and Presentment
The OCC has been very supportive of banks providing bill
payment and bill presentment services. In Conditional Approval
221 (December 4, 1996),80 the OCC allowed a group of banks to
form a limited liability company that would develop and operate
a platform for home banking services over the Internet. One
component of the proposal was to offer bill payment services.
More recently, this same consortium entered into an ar-
rangement with CheckFree Corporation to develop and operate a
bill payment service. As part of this request, the consortium took
warrants in CheckFree that, upon exercise, could permit the en-
tity to own up to 15% of CheckFree's common stock. CheckFree,
among other things, is the largest non-bank owned bill payment
80. OCC Conditional Approval 221, supra note 3.
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services provider.81 The OCC has had little problem determining
that bill payment services are within the permissible ambits of
the business of banking.
More recently, Citibank sought approval from the OCC to
invest in Transpoint, a venture with First Data Corporation and
Microsoft, to provide bill payment services. The OCC approved
the request in Conditional Approval 304 (March 5,1999).82
Each of these ventures has commenced providing bill pre-
sentment services as well, where a customer may receive bills in
electronic form over the Internet. The OCC approvals that have
approved bill payment services are broad enough to encompass
the bill presentment services as well.
C. Digital Signatures and Certificate Authority
Digital signatures are a cryptographic method of assuring
the identity of parties transmitting information across the Inter-
net and the integrity of the message transmitted. Digital signa-
tures are designed to address two of the key problems with
Internet messages, that of assuring that the party purporting to
send a message is actually the party sending the message, and of
assuring that the message received is actually the message sent.
Digital signatures rely upon public key/private key cryptogra-
phy, whereby key pairs provide the necessary assurance.
A digital certificate is like the cryptographic assurance
provided by a third party that the key pairs "belong" to the des-
ignated owner, and that they have not been compromised. A cer-
tificate authority, then, is a third party that stands behind the
cryptographic assurance. Banks, given their knowledge of and
relationships with customers, are natural parties to provide the
types of assurances.
In Conditional Approval 267 (January 12,1998),83 the OCC
81. See Conditional Approval 289 (October 2,1998), available in 1998 WL 850227.
82. Conditional Approval 304, Application by Citibank, N.A., New York, New
York, to Invest in Three Limited Liability Companies Through an Existing Operat-
ing Subsidiary (March 5,1999), available in 1999 WL 246480.
83. Conditional Approval 267, Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt
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approved a request by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lake City,
Utah, to establish an operating subsidiary that would act as a cer-
tification authority and repository for certificates used to verify
digital signatures. The OCC easily determined that the type of
service was similar to many services traditionally provided by
banks on behalf of customers (signature guarantees, notary ser-
vices, etc.), and determined that the services were a permissible
incident to the business of banking. The OCC devoted a signifi-
cant part of the letter to discussing the types of risks inherent in
the proposed business and outlining its safety and soundness
concerns.
More recently, Bank of America and Citibank sought ap-
proval to invest in a limited liability company through existing
operating subsidiaries that would explore the creation of an op-
erating company that would issue digital certificates, act as a sig-
nature authority, and assume some of the liability risks
associated with the activity. Part of the proposal included creat-
ing operating rules, liability limits and other conditions associ-
ated with the activity. The approval did not specifically provide
approval to engage in the activity, providing some indication that
the OCC might like to review the overall proposal, including the
liability risks, before the business became operational. 84
D. Internet Service Provider
In August, 1996, the OCC indicated that acting as an
Internet Service Provider ("ISP") in its community would be a
permissible activity for a national bank as an incident to provid-
ing home banking services to its customers.85 The OCC relied in
part upon its excess capacity interpretation, 6 indicating that as
the bank would need to invest and use Internet service technol-
Lake City, Utah, to Establish an Operating Subsidiary that Will Act as a Certifica-
tion Authority and Repository for Certificates Used to Verify Digital Signatures
January 12,1998), available in 1998 WL 41538.
84. See OCC Conditional Approval 301 (January 15, 1999), available in 1999 WL
74106.
85. See OCC Interpretive Letter 742 (August 19, 1996), available in 1996 WL
544203.
86. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.1019 (1999).
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ogy as part of its home banking service to its customers, it could
sell that capacity to non-customers as well. Interestingly, the re-
quest, from Apollo Trust Company, was from a state bank that
needed assurance that such an activity was permissible for a na-
tional bank so that it could engage in that activity as a state bank.
Similarly, in the Integrion order, the OCC allowed the
venture to act as an ISP as part of the banking services that would
be provided.8 7
In a somewhat related vein, the OCC has allowed national
banks to provide Web hosting services. In Interpretive Letter 856
(March 5, 1999),88 the OCC indicated that the business of banking
includes offering to merchant customers a commercially enabled
retail Web site hosting service so that participating merchants can
receive and process credit card orders over the Internet. While
the bank is not acting as the ISP, the bank is hosting the web site
of the merchant, with the intent of both allowing the bank's cus-
tomers to access the merchant, presumably from the bank's own
web pages, and allowing the merchant to access the bank's cus-
tomer base.
E. Software Design and Development
Within the permissible ambit of banking business is the
design and development of software to conduct the banking ac-
tivities. In OCC Interpretive Letter 756 (November 5, 1996),89 the
OCC allowed a bank to purchase a minority interest in a limited
liability company to be formed with an unaffiliated corporation
to engage in the development, distribution and maintenance of
computer software for cash management applications.
Similarly, in OCC Interpretive Letter 677 (June 28, 1995),90
87. See OCC Conditional Approval Letter 221, supra note 3.
88. Interpretive Letter 856 (March 5,1999), available in 1999 WL 183558.
89. OCC Interpretive Letter 756, Bank May Purchase a Minority Interest in a
Limited Liability Company to be Formed with an Unaffiliated Corporation to En-
gage in the Development, Distribution and Maintenance of Computer Software for
Cash Management Applications (November 5,1996), available in 1996 WL 700101.
90. OCC Interpretive Letter 677, The Establishment of Operating Subsidiaries
by Two National Banks to Engage Through a Joint Venture in the Development and
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
the OCC approved the acquisition by a group of bank of MECA,
the developer of the Managing Your Money personal financial
software.
F. Information Processing
Walter Wriston once described the business of banking as
the business of dealing with information. The OCC has author-
ized banks to engage in a variety of ventures devoted to assem-
bling, processing and transmitting information. A common
thread of all of these approvals is that the predominant activity of
the venture relates to financial, economic or banking information.
For example, in OCC Conditional Approval 282 Uuly 31, 1998),91
the OCC permitted NationsBank, National Association to estab-
lish an operating subsidiary, NationsBanc Health Services, Inc.,
that would acquire a one-half, non-controlling equity interest in
Electronic Health Services, L.L.C. The venture would capture,
process and distribute information on medical reimbursements
and payments and participate in the related payments flow. The
venture would also make available a variety of banking products,
and might under certain circumstances provide related and nec-
essary hardware. 92
G. The Problem of the Impermissible Incidental Activity
Technology activities rarely fit into neat boxes, and invest-
ments and acquisitions often bring into play potentially difficult
issues regarding activities that are not permissible for the bank or
bank holding company. Whether the issue involves electronic
games (a common problem) or some other non-financial activity,
Distribution of Home Banking and Financial Management Software and Data Proc-
essing Services June 28, 1995), available in 1995 WL 475450.
91. OCC Conditional Approval 282 (July 31,1998), available in 1998 WL 614596.
92. See OCC Interpretive Letter 419, Joint Venture to Facilitate Settlement and Pay-
ment of Health Insurance Claims Through the Use of Shred EFT Technology (February
16, 1988), available in 1988 WL 508734 (authorizing formation of a limited partnership to
"develop a data processing system linking health care providers, health care insurers,
health care recipients, and their respective depository institutions").
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the bank or bank holding company often needs to address
whether and how to bring the activities into compliance.
1. OCC
The OCC has developed a number of theories pursuant to
which incidental impermissible activities might be retained.
a. Excess Capacity
The OCC expanded a concept it had previously applied in
the real estate area, pursuant to which a bank could lease excess
office space to third parties. By extending the concept to the elec-
tronic arena, banks are able to market and sell excess computer
capacity to third parties, regardless of the nature or type of user.
The interpretive ruling reads as follows: "A national bank may
also, in order to optimize the use of the bank's resources, market
and sell to third parties electronic capacities acquired or devel-
oped by the bank in good faith for banking purposes." 93
This concept was utilized by the OCC in approving a re-
quest of a bank to participate in a venture to market electronic
imaging services. The primary targets of the venture were imag-
ing services for banks and other financial institutions and imag-
ing of financial data for non-financial services companies. The
OCC allowed the venture to market imaging services to non-
financial entities for use with non-financial data.94
b. Insignificant Part of Permissible Product
Offering
The OCC has on occasion adopted another approach to
impermissible activities, focusing upon the overall relationship
93. 12 C.F.R. § 7.1019 (1999).
94. See OCC Interpretive Letter 805, Letter Concludes that the "Business of
Banking" Includes 1) Electronic Imaging Services for Other Banks and Financial
Institutions and 2) Electronic Imaging Services for Non-Banks if Limited to Finan-
cial Data and Documents (October 9,1997), available in 1997 WL 751157.
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between the permissible and impermissible activities. This is
particularly true where the products have broader applicability
than simply the permissible banking activities. For example, in
OCC Conditional Approval Letter 221 (December 4, 1996),9- the
OCC address the permissibility of providing Internet access as
part of a home banking program. It noted:
Finally, the Internet access feature will be only a minor part of
the entire package offered by the LLC (less than 10% of total net
income) and will entail little additional expense for the LLC.
Under these circumstances, we find the Internet access feature to
be validly incidental to the other LLC Services.
The OCC further stated:
Full function products provided as an incidental
part of a package of banking services cannot
dominate the banking services being provided. See
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 737, sup OCC In-
terpretive Letter No. 516, supra: Letter from Mi-
chael J. O'Keefe, District Counsel, Midwestern
District (July 13, 1987) (unpublished); OCC Inter-
pretive Letter No. 345, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 77,799 (July 9,1986).
The OCC has two alternative tests for determining
when sale of full function products as part of a
package of banking services is "incidental" to
those services. The older OCC test is whether the
cost of the full function product is less than 30% of
the cost of the entire package. OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 742, supra. As an alternative to the cost
test, a recent letter adopted a test based on the per-
centage of "gross profits" (sales less cost of goods
sold) that is derived from the sale of the hardware.
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 754, supra.
95. OCC Conditional Approval Letter 221, supra note 3.
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Specifically, this letter held that where the gross profits
generated by a full function product provided in connection with
a banking service do not exceed thirty percent of the total gross
profits from that service, the sale of the full function product is
incidental to the permitted banking service.
c. De-minimis Exceptions
In a couple of letters the OCC has indicated that a minor
amount of impermissible activities might not necessarily be fatal
to the overall activity, regardless of whether it is connected to the
permissible activities. For example, in OCC Interpretive Letter
677 (June 28, 1995),96 involving the acquisition by a group of bank
of MECA, the developer of the Managing Your Money personal
financial software. MECA had also developed gaming software.
The OCC noted that it was not a significant part of the overall
business of MECA, that MECA did not intend to devote further
resources to it, and that it would naturally dissipate over time.
In the Integrion/CheckFree letter, the OCC indicated that
there might be a "basket" available for impermissible activities.
The Integrion banks sought approval to hold a non-controlling
equity interest in CheckFree Corporation, and sought some as-
surance that if CheckFree commenced to engage in impermissible
activities, immediate divestiture would not be required. The
OCC gave the banks two years to accomplish divestiture were
CheckFree to engage in impermissible activities, but indicated
that it would consider whether immaterial impermissible activi-
ties might be allowed without requiring divestiture. It appears as
if the OCC wanted to make a determination based upon the type
and extent of the impermissible activities rather than making the
determination in advance.97
96. OCC Interpretive Letter 677, supra note 90.
97. See OCC Conditional Approval 289, supra note 81.
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d. Divestitures
When a national bank acquires entities engaging in im-
permissible activities, the normal requirement is for the bank to
cease engaging in that particular activity. In the context of ac-
quiring a state chartered bank, for instance, the OCC routinely
provides a two-year period in which to divest impermissible as-
sets. In a recent approval, the OCC indicated that this two-year
period would be applicable when a company in which a national
bank invests commences engaging in impermissible activities.98
2. Federal Reserve Board
The Federal Reserve, of course, operates under a different
statutory scheme, and thus its flexibility to address impermissible
activities is different. Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act 99 provides, with certain exceptions, that a bank holding
company may not hold or acquire more than 5% of the shares of
any company not engaged in business so closely related to the
business of banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a
proper incident thereto. As the Federal Reserve has amplified
the meaning of the statutory prohibition over the years, it has de-
termined that data processing activities, at least insofar as the ac-
tivities relate to economic, financial or banking data, are
permissible activities for bank holding companies.
a. Data Processing Exemption Under
Regulation Y
The Federal Reserve has long permitted bank holding
companies to engage in data processing activities. In 1971, data
processing was added to the list of activities deemed to be closely
related to banking, and permitted the processing of banking, fi-
98. See id.
99.12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994).
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nancial or related economic data.100 The Board noted at the time
that banks had historically performed certain types of billing and
processing services for their customers, and concluded that such
billing and data processing services were integrally related to the
basic money transmission functions traditionally performed by
banks.
In 1982, the Board expanded its data processing regulation
to allow additional types of related activities. Bank holding
companies were allowed to engage in processing all financial,
banking or economic information, thus permitting the processing
of all types of economic data without the requirement that the
economic data be related to other banking or financial data.' 01 it
was clear that the deletion of the term "related" was intended to
be significant.10 2
While the ability to engage in data processing activities
provides critical authority to engage in a variety of technology
activities, in practice the limitation that the activities be limited to
banking, financial or economic data proved to be somewhat re-
strictive. Technology companies often do not fit into neat boxes,
and companies processing permissible data often have compo-
nents of their businesses that are outside the scope of the permis-
sible limits of the prior regulation. When the Federal Reserve
revised Regulation Y in 1997, it provided much needed relief by
permitting a 30% "basket," pursuant to which processing activi-
ties could involve activities other than the banking, financial or
economic data.10 3
In a similar vein, the Federal Reserve had been restrictive
with respect to sales of hardware as part of permissible data
processing activities. In the past, the hardware either had to be
special purpose hardware (e.g., hardware specifically designed
for the transmission of the banking, financial or economic data)
or the general purpose hardware had to be not more than 10% of
100. See Bank Holding Companies, 57 FED. REs. BuLL. 512 (1971).
101. See 47 Fed. Reg. 37,368 (1982).
102. See Memorandum from Legal Division to the Board of Governors, August 12,
1982; Order, Citicorp (Citishare), 53 Fed. Res. Bull. 505 (1982).
103. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(14)(ii) (1999).
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the cost of a packaged offering. The revision lifted the 10% bas-
ket to 30%.104
b. Two-year divestitures
There is no statutory authority permitting a bank holding
company to commence an impermissible activity and then divest
the activity at some later date. There is authority in the act, un-
der certain conditions, for a bank holding company to have a pe-
riod of time to bring non-conforming activities into conformity.
For example, when a company becomes a bank holding com-
pany, it has two years in which to divest or cease impermissible
nonbanking activities.10 5 Similarly, banks that "inherit" imper-
missible assets as a results of debts previously contracted are al-
lowed time to divest the assets.10 6
The Federal Reserve has been willing to allow bank hold-
ing companies an opportunity to divest shares of companies that
they do not control if the companies commence impermissible
activities. 0 7 Under the circumstances, the Federal Reserve indi-
cated a willingness to allow the bank up to two years to divest its
ownership of shares were the entity to commence impermissible
activities.
c. MECA and Paribas Orders
Two orders issued prior to the Regulation Y Revision in
1997 provide some indication that the Federal Reserve might be
flexible under appropriate circumstances. On February 6, 1996,
the Federal Reserve permitted The Royal Bank of Canada to ac-
quire 20% of the voting stock of MECA Software, L.L.C. Royal
Bank applied to join BankAmerica, NationsBank, Fleet, and First
104. See id. at § 225.28(b)(14)(i)(B).
105. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1994).
106. See id. at § 1842(a) and 1843(c)(2).
107. See Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Royal Bank of Can-
ada/Integrion/ CheckFree, 1999).
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Bank Systems as owners of MECA. 08 Each of the other banks
owned their respective shares of MECA through bank operating
subsidiaries; Royal Bank, as a foreign bank, needed the Federal
Reserve's approval under Regulation Y.
The MECA Managing Your Money software and related ser-
vices easily fall within the parameters of Regulation Y. It is a
computer program that allows customers to conduct basic bank-
ing functions and personal financial management using personal
computers. The software, and related financial software, is mar-
keted both to consumers and financial institutions, to allow the
institutions to offer such services to their customers. From the
Federal Reserve's point of view, there was no problem associated
with the acquisition of at least that portion of MECA that was
engaging in the financial software programs.
Importantly, MECA had also developed and marketed
various non-financial software, including games, a computer se-
curity program, a medical reference library, and a program pro-
viding basic legal forms. These activities do not fall within the
Regulation Y limitations. The Board, however, permitted MECA
to keep, and indeed continue, these activities. MECA and the
Bank indicated that the revenues from the impermissible activi-
ties were small, amounting to approximately 7% of 1994 reve-
nues, that MECA had no intention of developing new non-
financial software or to upgrade, enhance or promote its current
non-financial programs, and that the non-financial portion of the
company's business was expected to diminish over time. Based
on the limited nature of the activity, the Board approved the ac-
quisition and did not require the cessation or divestiture of the
impermissible activities.
On February 26, the Board approved an application of
Compagnie Financiere de Paribas to engage de novo in providing
an integrated software program to operators of digital mobile
telephone networks to perform billing and account-related ser-
vices for customer accounts.10 9 The software calculates bills
108. See FRB, Order Approving a Notice to Engage in Data Processing Activi-
ties (Feb. 6,1996), available in 1996 WL 47572.
109. See FRB, Order Approving Notice to Provide Mobile Telephone Billing
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based on data provided by the telephone operator, such as date,
time, duration, and destination of the call, the customer's service
contract, and individual account balances. The company also
provides general accounting services, such as recording pay-
ments and balances, provides billing and settlement services, and
generates various related reports to the operator.
Part of the services performed consist of customer identifi-
cation and account information and the generation of certain re-
ports used by the operator to detect fraud. While these functions
would be performed only in connection with the data processing
and billing services, they are not within the list of "banking, fi-
nancial or economic" information described in Regulation Y. The
Board, however, allowed the company to engage in these activi-
ties, describing them as a "relatively small part" of the operation
of the company, "incidental" to the primary billing and account
functions to be provided to the telephone operator.
Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, Paribas owns a
majority of France Telecom, the French national telephone oper-
ating company, and owns 49.9% of Financiere Sema, a French in-
vestment company that in turn owns 41.6% of Sema Group plc,
which developed the software. It was not stated whether Sema
offered the product overseas. Sema proposed to establish the
company as a wholly-owned U.S.-based subsidiary to sell the
software described in the proposal.
These two orders were well beyond the regulatory
framework in place at the time they were issued. Perhaps they
were just precursors of the revision allowing the 30% basket for
otherwise impermissible activities. They may indicate, however,
a more pragmatic and practical outlook towards acquisitions of
and investment in technology companies.110
Software (Feb. 26,1996), available in 1996 WL 81455.
110. See also Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Royal Bank of Can-
ada/Integrion/CheckFree, 1999).
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IV. JOINT VENTURES AND SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS:
EXPLOITING THE TECHNOLOGY PROWESS OF OTHERS
A. Operating Subsidiaries and Minority Investments - National
Banks
1. Operating Subsidiaries
Both the Comptroller of the Currency and every state regu-
lator will permit a bank to establish an operating subsidiary. An
operating subsidiary is a subsidiary of the bank established to
engage in activities which the bank itself could engage in di-
rectly. The decision to engage in bank-permissible activities
through subsidiaries is viewed as a corporate and strategic deci-
sion. While banks do conduct a wide variety of fairly mundane
activities through operating subsidiaries, they have become the
vehicles for some of the most interesting developments in the ex-
pansion of products and services, particularly joint activities with
non-bank entities.
Establishing an operating subsidiary generally requires the
approval of the bank's chartering authority, either the OCC for
national banks or the state for state banks. There is no separate
approval required from the Federal Reserve or the FDIC for a
state bank to establish an operating subsidiary. There are two
important caveats to this latter statement, however. First, the
Federal Reserve does take the position that without prior ap-
proval, a state bank subsidiary of a bank holding company may
not acquire less than all of the shares of a subsidiary company
engaged in activities permissible for the parent bank without
prior approval under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company
Act."'
The OCC has recently revised its rules for establishing op-
111. See 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1999).
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erating subsidiaries in part 5 of its regulations. The regulation
previously required that the parent bank own at least 80% of the
voting stock of the subsidiary. That requirement has been re-
duced to 50%. The revision provides that certain types of activi-
ties may be conducted in subsidiaries without the need for any
notice to the OCC. An after the fact notice is sufficient for well-
capitalized, well-managed institutions. Other banks must gener-
ally go through a notice or approval process, and this process
will be applied to all banks with respect to certain types of activi-
ties. The OCC may condition its approval of an operating sub-
sidiary.12
No notice or approval from the OCC is required for an op-
erating subsidiary if the activities are limited to those previously
approved for an operating subsidiary of the bank, those activities
continue to be legally permissible, and the activities are con-
ducted in accordance with any previously imposed conditions.
The OCC's regulations generally require that the operating
subsidiary must limit its activities to those permissible for the
bank, and will be subject to the same examination and supervi-
sion as the parent bank. The revised regulations hold out the
possibility that an operating subsidiary might not need to limit
its activities precisely to those permissible for the bank, and indi-
cate that the subsidiary need not necessarily be supervised and
examined as a bank. Various orders of the OCC indicate that
compliance even with the 50% requirement is not mandatory,
and that various ventures are permissible through operating sub-
sidiaries which, while not impermissible for a bank to engage in,
are in practical terms unlikely to be subject to bank-like supervi-
sion and regulation.
The OCC's regulations speak in terms of subsidiary corpo-
rations. The OCC has approved a bank's participation in an op-
erating subsidiary structured as a limited liability company, and
has allowed a bank to be a limited partner in a partnership. The
OCC can not approve a bank becoming a general partner in a
partnership, due to concerns relating to the unlimited liability of
112. See id. at § 5.34.
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a partner,113 but it has allowed a bank to establish a corporate
subsidiary to serve as the general partner of a partnership.
Depending upon the activity, the OCC may impose limita-
tions on a bank's investment in an operating subsidiary. Such
limitations are typically imposed when the bank is engaging in
activities perceived to be risky or where there is substantial par-
ticipation by non-affiliated entities. "Investment" includes both
the direct equity investment in the operating subsidiary as well
as any loans or extensions of credit to or for the benefit of the
subsidiary. The common limitation is 5% of assets.
The OCC has indicated that it will consider on a case by
case basis whether an operating subsidiary might engage in ac-
tivities which, while closely related to banking, are not within the
ambit of legal or permissible activities. 114 The bank would have
to establish a number of safeguards to insulate itself from any
liability or exposure to the activities of the subsidiary, and the
OCC would have to satisfy itself that there are no legal or policy
reasons why the activity could not be conducted in the subsidi-
ary. At this point, the only activity the OCC has approved under
this authority is the underwriting and dealing in municipal reve-
nue bonds, an activity closely related to traditional bank activi-
ties, but impermissible for national banks under provisions of the
National Bank Act. The earliest approval was of a request by
Zions Bank, OCC Conditional Approval 262 (December 11,
1997).115 There have been three subsequent approvals. There
have been no technology or electronic commerce requests, al-
though there is no reason why such a request could not be made
or approved.
113. See Merchants National Bank v. Wehrman, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
114. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f) (1999).
115. OCC Conditional Approval 262, Decision of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency on the Application by Zions First National Bank, Salt Lkae City, Utah, to
Commence New Activities in an Operating Subsidiary (December 11, 1997), avail-
able in 1997 WL 816878.
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2. Minority Investments
Of much more interest, perhaps, and unquestionably the
subject of more regulatory attention, is the issue of the minority
investment. The minority investment allows the bank to partici-
pate in ventures with technology companies and others where
the parties are each bringing substantial expertise and assets to
the venture, but the bank will not be the controlling owner.
Commencing in about 1995, the OCC adopted a series of straight-
forward rules for determining whether the investment would be
permissible.
A national bank may engage in activities that are part of or
incidental to the business of banking by means of an operating
subsidiary116 In a variety of circumstances the OCC has permit-
ted national banks to own, either directly or indirectly through
an operating subsidiary, a minority interest in an enterprise. The
OCC has concluded that such minority investments are permit-
ted in the event four criteria are satisfied. These standards are as
follows:
a. The activities are limited to those that are
part of, or incidental to, the business
of banking.
The OCC's analysis of the business of banking has been
broad and expansive. Many of the Interpretive Letters and Con-
ditional Approvals referenced in Part II above were issued in the
context of minority investments.
b. The investing bank must be able to prevent
the enterprise from engaging in activities that
are not part of or incidental to the business of
banking, or must be able to withdraw their in-
vestment.
116. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1999).
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The bank is generally able to satisfy this requirement in
one of several ways. Generally, the governing documents of the
venture will limit the activities of the venture to activities that are
bank permissible. As the venture lacks the power to engage in
impermissible activities, the OCC is comforted.1 7 Alternatively,
special voting rights may be given the bank investor to veto or
block any attempt to engage in impermissible activities. Finally,
the bank, if it is unable to prevent the venture from engaging in
impermissible activities, must be able to exit the venture.118
c. The liability of the bank must be limited, as
a legal and accounting matter, and the bank
must not have open-ended liability for the
obligations of the enterprise
A primary concern of the OCC is that national banks
should not be subjected to undue risk. Where the investing bank
will not control the operations of the entity in which the bank
holds an interest, it is important that a bank's investment not ex-
pose it to unlimited liability. It is relatively easy to satisfy this
standard through the use of corporate entities or other forms of
organization with limited shareholder liability. Perhaps the most
common structure for many of the ventures is the Delaware lim-
ited liability company, providing statutory protection for share-
holders as well as potential pass-through tax treatment.
In assessing a bank's loss exposure as an accounting mat-
ter, the OCC has previously noted that the appropriate account-
117. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval Letter 317, Application of First Ten-
nessee Bank, N.A., Memphis, Tennessee, to Participate in a Joint Venture Real Es-
tate Tax Reporting and Management Services (Uuly 17, 1999), available in 1999 WL
711407 (involving a request from First Tennessee Bank, N.A. to participate in a joint
venture real estate tax reporting and management service, where partnership agree-
ments limited the power of participants to engage in impermissible activities).
118. See, e.g., OCC Conditional Approval 289, supra note 81 (where the OCC
indicated that the ability to divest the interests acquired within a two year period
would satisfy this criteria. In this particular interest, the banks held only warrants
in the target company, had no board representation, and no legal or contractual
power to limit the activities of the target company).
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ing treatment for a minority investment by a bank in a company
is to report it as an unconsolidated subsidiary under the equity or
cost method of accounting. Under the cost method, losses recog-
nized by the investor will not exceed the amount of the invest-
ment (including extensions of credit or guarantees, if any) shown
on the investor's books. Under the equity method, unless the
bank has guaranteed any of the liabilities of the entity or has
other financial obligations to the entity, losses are generally lim-
ited to the amount of the investment, including loans and other
advances shown on the investor's books. The equity method of
accounting is generally appropriate for investments of 20% or
more of the equity of a company. Under either method, how-
ever, the losses of the venture do not pass to the books of the par-
ent owners.
d. The investment must be convenient or
useful to the bank in carrying out its business,
and not a mere passive investment unrelated to
that bank's banking business.
A national bank's investment in an enterprise or entity
must also satisfy the requirement that the investment have a
beneficial connection to the bank's business. That is, it must be
convenient or useful to the bank's business and not merely a pas-
sive investment unrelated to the bank's banking business. 12
U.S.C. 24 (Seventh)" 9 gives national banks incidental powers that
are "necessary" to carry on the business of banking. "Necessary"
has been judicially construed to mean "convenient or useful." 120
OCC precedents on non-controlling investments have indicated
that the investment must be convenient or useful to the bank in
conducting that bank's business. The investment must benefit or
facilitate that business and cannot be a mere passive or specula-
tive investment.
119.12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) (1994).
120. Arnold Tours v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427,432 (1st Cir. 1972).
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B. Minority Investments - Bank Holding Companies
1. The Less Than 5% Investment
As noted above, the Bank Holding Company Act pre-
cludes a bank holding company from owning or controlling vot-
ing shares of any company that is not a bank except under certain
conditions. One of the more significant of those conditions is
found in Section 4(c)(5) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12
U.S.C. 1843(c)(5),12' which allows a bank holding company to
hold "shares of any company which do not include more than 5
percentum of the outstanding voting shares of such company."
While there is a fair amount of regulatory gloss on this ex-
ception (e.g., it is generally intended to be a non-controlling, pas-
sive investment), it can provide an important avenue for a bank
holding company to engage in venture capital investing or other
forms of strategic investing in technology companies without
having to (i) obtain prior approval or satisfy notice requirements,
or (ii) be particularly concerned about whether the activities of
the target are bank holding company permissible. As a result,
bank holding companies are actively structuring investments in-
volving combinations of debt, non-voting and voting equity and
equity rights such as warrants and options, designed to allow
them to participate strategically, technologically and financially
in technology companies.
An important guidance is the Federal Reserve's policy
statement on non-voting equity investments.122 The policy
statement details the types of structures that are consistent with
the provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, and those that
are likely to cause problems under the Act. While the Federal
Reserve issued the policy statement in the context of bank hold-
ing company investments in other banking organizations, the
Federal Reserve applies the logic of the policy statement to in-
vestments in non-banking organizations.
121.12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1994).
122. See II F.R.R.S. 4-172.1 (March 1994).
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2. Section 4(c)(8) and Regulation Y
Section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act allows
investments in companies that the Board has determined to be so
closely related to the business of banking or of managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. As imple-
mented by the Board's Regulation Y,23 the Board has elucidated
the list of activities that satisfy the statutory criteria.
Importantly, data processing is a permissible activity for
bank holding companies. Regulation Y now provides as follows:
Data processing.
(i) Providing data processing and data transmis-
sion services, facilities (including data processing
and data transmission hardware, software, docu-
mentation, or operating personnel), data bases, ad-
vice, and access to such services, facilities, or data
bases by any technological means, if:
(A) The data to be processed or furnished are fi-
nancial, banking, or economic; and
(B) The hardware provided in connection
therewith is offered only in conjunction with soft-
ware designed and marketed for the processing
and transmission of financial, banking, or eco-
nomic data, and where the general purpose hard-
ware does not constitute more than 30 percent of
the cost of any packaged offering.
(ii) A company conducting data processing and
data transmission activities may conduct data
processing and data transmission activities not de-
123. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1999).
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scribed in paragraph (b)(14)(i) of this section if the
total annual revenue derived from those activities
does not exceed 30 percent of the company's total
annual revenues derived from data processing and
data transmission activities.
Regulation Y now provides an expedited notice process
permitting well-capitalized and well-managed banks to com-
mence on a de novo basis or acquire companies engaged in data
processing activities.124 The notice requirement consists of sub-
mitting basic financial and managerial data regarding the activity
and the investment. Companies that are not eligible for the ex-
pedited notice process can still go through an application and
approval process.
C. Outsourcing
It would be unusual for a bank to perform all of its tech-
nology functions internally. Most banks will go through an ex-
tensive evaluation process to measure in-house capabilities, in-
house costs and the corresponding capacities of non-bank pro-
viders. Each of the regulatory authorities recognizes the business
necessity of outsourcing, and thus is generally supportive of the
concept. On the other hand, each also recognizes that the bank
maintains the underlying obligations to its customers, and the
overall responsibility for compliance with laws, rules and regula-
tions. Accordingly, outsourcing arrangements should be subject
to intense scrutiny by the institution, as they will be subject to
intense scrutiny by the regulators.
1. The FFIEC Information Systems Handbook
The FFIEC has provided an extensive handbook' 25
124. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.24 (1999).
125. Federal Financial Istitutions Examination Council, OCC, Information Sys-
tems Handbook.
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for banks as they address possible outsourcing arrangements.
The handbook describes some of the primary considerations in
outsourcing arrangements and the essential contractual elements
to be contained in any agreement. Of particular importance, ac-
cording to the FFIEC, are the following:
" An accurate description of the services to be
performed, with appropriate service level
agreements and including a precise allocation
of responsibilities. Among other things, the
agreement should address the frequency of
processing and the types and frequency of re-
ports. Timing and delivery requirements are
also critical.
" Costs, including development, conversion,
processing, upgrades and enhancements and
special items. The mechanism for increases or
modifications should be addressed. The ar-
rangement should also address the penalties
for inadequate or non-performance.
* On-line communications availability, transmis-
sion line security and alternate data entry
methods.
" Audit rights and responsibilities.
" Backup data retention, record protection and
disaster recovery responsibilities and require-
ments.
" Liability for loss or damage to information or
equipment, and related insurance protection.
" Confidential treatment of data and compliance
with privacy and confidentiality policies.
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" Rights upon termination to data, equipment
and related items, including appropriate transi-
tion arrangements and assistance and related
costs.
" Termination or cancellation rights and associ-
ated fees and penalties.
" Processing priorities.
" Notification of system changes, upgrades or
any potential interruptions in service.
" Periodic reporting of financial condition of the
servicer. Obviously, the importance of this
provision escalates with (i) the size of the ser-
vicer and (ii) the overall importance of the ser-
vices provided to the institution.
" Training responsibilities.
" Impact of insolvency or receivership of either
party.
* Contract and penalty provisions.
" Ability to assign duties and responsibilities.
" Sensitivity to essential services.
" Prohibition of gifts, premiums or bonuses that
might run afoul of anti-bribery proscriptions.
2000]
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2. The Bank Service Corporation Act
The Bank Service Corporation Act,126 allows the bank regu-
latory agencies examination authority over entities providing
banking services to banks under contractual arrangements. 12
U.S.C. 1867(c) provides:
[W]henever a bank that is regularly exam-
ined by an appropriate Federal banking agency, or
any subsidiary or affiliate of such a bank that is
subject to examination by that agency, causes to be
performed for itself, by contract or otherwise, any
services authorized under this chapter, whether on
or off its premises
(1) such performance shall be subject to
regulation and examination by such agency to the
same extent as if such services were being per-
formed by the bank itself on its own premises, and
(2) the bank shall notify such agency of the
existence of the service relationship within thirty
days after the making of such service contract or
the performance of the service, whichever occurs
first.
The existence of the regulatory authority may come as a
surprise to certain vendors. It is extremely important that they be
aware of the regulatory jurisdiction. The contract should require
the vendor to submit to such jurisdiction and examination, pro-
vide all necessary information and generally cooperate with re-
spect to the regulatory obligations.
126.12 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994)
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3. FDIC Authority over Disadvantageous Contracts
When FIRREA 127 was enacted in 1989, Congress added a
provision to the FDIC's powers prohibiting a depository institu-
tion from entering into a contract with any person to provide
goods, products or services to or for the benefit of such deposi-
tory institution if the performance of such contract would ad-
versely affect the safety or soundness of the institution.128 The
provision was prompted by a series of data processing contracts
the FDIC "inherited" when an institution failed which were ex-
tremely disadvantageous to the institution, and thus to the FDIC.
In that light, the FFIEC Handbook mentions a series of
provisions that should be avoided in outsourcing contracts.
These directly relate to inducements that may have a short-term
positive effect on a bank's capital position, but have long-term
detrimental effects. For example, the FFIEC warns against offers
to purchase certain assets (e.g., computer equipment or fore-
closed real estate) at book value, offers to purchase capital stock,
offers to make an up-front cash payment, or offers to allow defer-
ral of conversion costs or fees. In general, the FFIEC advises that
the service provider will usually recoup the costs of these in-
ducements through a premium charge for the underlying data
processing services, which adversely affects the financial condi-
tion of the bank.
V. PRIVACY
Privacy of customer information has taken on an important
role in banking today as customers have grown increasingly sen-
sitive to the treatment of their personal information. This con-
cern becomes even more significant given the increasing use of
the Internet by banks to deliver their services to the public. Con-
sumers' fears concerning their personal information could
127. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 101-1404, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.)
128.12 U.S.C. § 1831g (1994).
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quickly turn to distrust of Internet banking. Therefore, effective
privacy practices are a key to the future success of Internet bank-
ing.
Bank privacy statements and policies vary greatly. Banks
have taken varied approaches to the issue of transferring or sell-
ing customer information to third parties for the purposes of fa-
cilitating the marketing of products and services to the customer
base. 29
A. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act130 is discussed above, 13' and
imposes strict requirements on entities that collect, transmit and
use information on consumers for the purpose of making (or al-
lowing others to make) credit and certain other decisions. The
definitional sections in the Act are of extreme importance, as they
define consumer report, consumer reporting agency, and the
various other entities that can be brought within the scope of the
act by virtue of their collection, transmission or use of consumer
information.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act allows banks to gather and
use their own experiential information in making credit deci-
sions, and allows them to share certain of that information with
credit reporting agencies. It also allows banks to use information
from credit reporting agencies in making credit and certain other
decisions, but imposes certain obligations on banks when they
deny credit or access to other services or opportunities on the ba-
sis of information contained in the credit report. A bank can be-
come a credit reporting agency and thus become subject to the
requirements associated with maintaining accurate information
129. Some examples include:
<http://www.firstunion.com/help/legal/privacy.html>
<http://wellsfargo.com/privacy/>
<http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/>
<http://www.firstib.com/about/privstate.html>.
130.12 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)
131. See supra part I.C.3.e.
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and allowing consumers to correct erroneous information.
Recently the OCC has expressed some concern about
banks withholding information from credit reporting agencies.
While there is no statutory obligation for banks to share the in-
formation they may have obtained based upon direct transac-
tions with the customer, the OCC has indicated that as accurate
credit information is of benefit to the overall credit industry, it
would look unfavorably upon a lender that refused to share basic
information with the credit reporting agencies.
The FCRA obligations must be considered by banks when
developing privacy statements for their customers. Banks will
clearly want to reserve the right to share permissible experiential
information with the credit reporting agencies, even though they
might be willing to commit to their customers not to share infor-
mation with third party marketers.
B. OCC Advisory Letter 99-6, Guidance to National Banks on Web
Site Privacy Statements.
In Advisory Letter 99-6, issued May 4, 1999,132 the OCC
provides national banks and examining personnel with examples
of effective practices for informing consumers who access bank
web sites about bank privacy policies relating to confidential cus-
tomer information. These practices fall into three basic catego-
ries: clear disclosure about the handling of customer information,
consistent internal polices concerning private customer informa-
tion, and mechanisms to enhance compliance with bank privacy
policies.
Effective disclosure consists of two elements, disclosing the
proper information and choosing an effective mechanism to
make the disclosure. With respect to the first element, many
banks choose to post privacy notices on their web sites that ac-
knowledge their clients' privacy expectations and indicate how
those expectations will be met. Additionally, banks may inform
132. OCC Advisory Letter 99-6, Guidance to National Banks on Web Site Pri-
vacy Statements (May 4,1999), available in 1999 WL 292913.
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their customers of the limitations placed on bank employees re-
garding the use of customer information. They may also chose to
describe the circumstances in which customer information will be
given to third parties. Some banks even allow customers them-
selves to restrict the use of their personal information.
With regard to the mechanism used to disclose the bank's
privacy policies, some banks simply post their policies directly
on their web sites. Other institutions choose to use a "hypertext"
link that allows the customer to view their banks policies if they
so choose. Finally, some banks place links to their privacy poli-
cies in the footer of each of their web site pages.
In addition to disclosing their privacy policies to consum-
ers, banks also need internal guidelines for implementing those
policies. Effective internal guidelines tend to have several com-
mon elements. For instance, they generally involve senior man-
agement. This is because senior management is uniquely capable
of providing a broad perspective on the issues, allocating the
necessary resources, and creating the necessary culture to ensure
that privacy matters are given due care across the organization.
Another common trait of effective internal policies is that they
are often developed in interdisciplinary groups to guarantee that
the policies are suitable to the entire organization.
Well-intentioned internal policies are, however, of little
importance if there is not a system in place to ensure policy com-
pliance. With this in mind, banks have taken action to encourage
compliance by their own personnel as well as unaffiliated third
parties. Banks have worked to inform their personnel of their
privacy polices through employee handbooks, training pro-
grams, codes of ethics, and Intranet postings among other things.
Banks have also begun using internal audits to evaluate policy
compliance. Finally, banks have started punishing violations of
their confidentiality polices as they would any other breach of
policy. With respect to third-parties such as data processing
agents, banks have simply begun requiring the execution of con-
fidentiality agreements.
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C. FDIC FIL 86-98, Online Privacy of Consumer Information.
Financial institutions have been compiling consumer data
for many years. Recent surveys have revealed, however, that
bank customers are growing increasingly concerned with the col-
lection, use and dissemination of such information, particularly
over the Internet. FIL 86-98133, like OCC Advisory Letter 99-6,
addresses these concerns. The overarching issue in both publica-
tions is the growing role of the Internet in banking and the poten-
tial harm caused to the reputations of banks if customer
information is not adequately protected.
FIL 86-98 articulates several fundamental elements of a
successful privacy policy. Foremost on this list is the need for
banks to provide their customers notice of the banks' information
collection practices. This notice should include the identity of the
party collecting the consumer data, how the information will be
collected, why the information is being collected, how the infor-
mation will be used, and how the consumer may limit disclosure
of the information. According to the FDIC, this notice should be
conspicuously placed on the financial institution's web site,
should be clearly stated and easily understood by consumers.
FIL 86-98 emphasizes that privacy issues are a self-
regulatory matter for the financial services industry to handle on
its own. In this self-regulatory context, privacy polices and in-
formation protections can only be effective if accompanied by
personnel training and adequate internal controls. Internal con-
trols should effectively check compliance with the institution's
privacy polices and information practices. Even beyond their
own personnel, banks are now also responsible for ensuring that
third parties such as parties to outsourcing agreements avoid
making improper disclosures of personal consumer information.
133. See FDIC, FIL 86-98, Online Privacy of Consumer Personal Information,
(Aug. 17,1998), available in 1998 WL 664495.
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